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Book Review: The Man Who Tried to Save the World: The

Dangerous Life and Mysterious Disappearance of Fred Cuny
Rory J. Conces
Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 68 I 82-0265
Anderson. Scott. Tire Ma11 W/ro Tried to Save the
World: Tht Dangerous Life and Mysterious Disappearance of Fred Cuny. New York: Doubleday.
1999. 374pp. $24.95 (clo1h).
Occasionally a biography is writlen about an individual
who is "cut" from a different piece of clo1h 1han lhat of the
rest of us. The Ma11 Who Tried to Save the World: The Dangerous Life (lfld Mysttrious Disappearance of Fnd Cuny is
such a biography. Scotl Anderson. a war correspondent who
has covered numerous connicts around the world, tells the
story of this most extraordinary humanitarian relief expen.
Fred Cuny considered the interests of sirangers to be more
imponant than those of his own and eventually gave his life
in the pursuit of rendering assistance to those who most
needed it. Some readers may have difficulty calling Cuny a
hero because he left his son with his parents so that he could
satisfy his "higher" calling, but Cuny was an extraordinary
man who faced an extraordinary moral dilemma: "Do I stay
to watch my son's basketball game, or do I go back out
there where people arc counting on me. where if I don't go
another five, six. one thousand-pick a number-people
are going to dier' Although The Mar1 \Vito Tried 10 Save the
World is not a case of hero worship nor a treatise on social
justice, it docs portray a man who felt deeply about the injustices perpetrated against the poorer peoples of the world
and who worked on their behalf. Unlike the writings on justice by theoreticians like John Rawls and Robert Nozick
and the conduct by activists like Gandhi and Manin Luther
King, Jr.. Anderson ·s book ponrays Fred Cuny as a prac1itioner-a man of immense practical ability and drive, who
possessed a vision ofjust.ice and how it should work in the
world.
In the Preface. Anderson sets the stage for Pans One.
Three. and Four which deal with the background and circumstances surrounding Cuny's disappearance in Chechnya
in April 1995. Some or Anderson ·s nam11ive is extremely
chilling. The author's description of the shelling of Bamut,
a small town 11 miles from Grozny and the town in which
Cuny was last seen alive. captures the sense of hopelessness and terror that is felt by people caught in such predicaments. What makes this even more troublesome is
Anderson's telling pronouncement that the majority of casualties of wars in the latter decades of this century have
been civilians (74 percent by the 1980s). Indeed. conflicts
like those that look place in Bosnia and Rwanda leave little
doubt to this 1rend.

Pans One, Three, and Four that deal with Cuny's work
and disappearance in Chechnya. which constitute the bulk
of 1he book, give a very interesting ponrayal of Cuny and
1he problems of working in war-lorn areas such as the
Caucasus. Cuny's fateful trip into Ingustietia and Chechnya
began in March I995. founeen weeks after the conflict between the Russian army and Chechen separatists began. His
mission involved a "needs assessment" of the war zone tha1
was requested by the financier and philanthropist George
Soros. but expanded 10 include meelings wi1h senior
Chechen rebel commanders and Russian generals in an al·
tempt to arrange a cease-fire so that he could evacuate an
estimated 30,000 civilians from lhe capital cily of Groz.ny.
Cuny failed to secure a cease-fire, but Anderson makes it
clear why Cuny's success was to be denied in Chechnya, an
area that Cuny called "the scariest place l have ever been."
Anderson observes that the conOicl in Chechnya had a
tremendous impact on Cuny. As noted by someone who
worked with Cuny in the field, "he'd [Cuny] always loved
people, believed in their intrinsic goodness. but ... in
Chechnya he saw 1he mask of civilizalion slip." Although
he was usually optimistic in very difficult situations like
those he faced in the Congo and Bosnia, Cuny lost this sense
of optimism in the Caucasus. Perhaps Cuny himself lost
sight of the three mistakes that he thought a person could
make in Chechnya and which capture the sense of peril that
was experienced by Cuny. First, "to ever imagine there is a
pattern. or logic, to any of it. Instead, this is a land and a war
where any terrible thing can happen at any moment, where
trying to grasp its full range of lies and treacheries and contrndictions st.rains the limits of the human imagination."
Second, "to ever imagine tha1 one side is better-more compassionate, less vicious-than lhe other. In this war. both
sides have committed a stunning array of crimes." Third,
"the belief lhat you can change things, bring an end to the
madness, the awful mistake of imaging you might somehow save it." These words find their roots in the history of
Chechnya, a history of a fiercely independent people who
have since the mid-l 700s seized every opponunity to resist
any Russian attempt to conquer them. Although the tsarist
and Stalinist programs to solve the Chechen problem involved lhe use or force to scatter the Chechen people across
the vast expanses of the Russian empire, lhe Chechens have
always fought 10 reclaim their homeland. The ou1come of
the most recent attempt by Russian President Boris Yeltsin
to subdue lhe self-proclaimed Chechen President Dudayev
and the Chechen people was a failure, with large numbers
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of casualties of both combatants and non-combata.nts.
Anderson's description of the Chechen War and the explanations of its origin make for interesting reading.

The final ponion of the book deals with Cony's March
31 trip into Chechnya with four others as well as the man-

hunt by an odd collection of governments and agencies to
find them after the outside world lost track of them on April
13. Anderson's explanation of the problems experienced by
those who seriously scarclu;d for the missin.s group l""d.nge
from tbe bad timing of trying to focus sufficient attention
and resources to the search because of the administration's
preoccupation with the April 21 bombing of the Federal

that Cuny developed a strong sense of justice and the need
to actively provide assistance in the face of state sponsored
genocide. This was followed by a short stint as a refugee
worker in East Pakistan, which was devastated by a cyclone
and a civil war. Here Cuny concluded that the disaster relief
system was outdated and in need of an overhaul. He per·
ccived too much competition between private groups and

government agencies, as well as a basic lack of knowledge
about the region aud culture. which lead tCK> often to inap-

knowledge that some Chechen leaders might not have
wished to be made public.
Although much of the book deals with Cuny in

propriate aid and the needless death of thousands of people.
These defining moments gave direction to Cuny·s life, leading him to create his own disaster relief consulting company, lntertect, which had as a goal to radically reconstruct
the way disaster relief systems operated throughout the
world.
It is from this poi~t on that Cuny became immersed in
the natural and wartime disasters that plagued the people of
the Third World, especially the poor. The 1972 earthquake
in Managua, Nicaragua, lead Cuny 10 devise improved refugee camp designs to save assistance dollars because they
could prevent secondary problems such as outbreaks of infectious diseases and sanitation breakdowns, as well as
lessen the feeling of alienation that was a common part of
traditional camp life. Re found that he could accomplish
much of this by simply using single-family tents arranged
in a cross.. axis, with a common area in the center.
Another devastating earthquake in Central America, the

Chechnya. the more fascinating ponion of the book is found

Gualcmala earlhquakc of 1976, prompted Cuny to institute

in Part 2, which presents not only Cuny's life up to his disappearance, but also a glimpse ofCuny·s vision of humanitarian relief. Anderson's presentation provides a fine introduction of this vision for the general reader. though someone with more background in this area may find some of his
presentation of Cuny's ideas overly simplistic. The book
could have benefitted from greater explanation of thecausal
relations that Cuny found operating in the world.
There were a number of pivotal moments in Cuny's
life that made him fully aware of social injustice in the world
and that molded his vision of humanitarian relief. Perhaps
the first was his transfer to Texas College of Ans and Industries in Kingston. a city that was sharply divided between
the economic havc's and have-not's, and his earning a de-

a plan to teach the indigenous population how to build safer
structures. These experiences eventually led Cuny to write
a four-volume Relief Operations Guidebook, which served
as a manifesto of his new approach to relief and pans of
which most surely can be found in his two published works,
Disasters and Developme111 (lntenect Press, 1994) and Fami11e. Co11flict and Respo11se: A Basic Guide (Kumarian Press,
1999). His approach was not readily accepted by mainstream
relief groups partly because it advocated a cheaper way of
providing assistance. The cozy arrangements that many
USAID workers had when they served overseas were undercut by Cuny's insistence that aid workers live in the field
so that they could be closer to needs areas.
As Anderson notes, Cuny moved lntenect away from
natural disasters 10 coping with disasters that were the result of war: El Salvador 1984, Sudan 1984, Hom of Africa
1987, and Sri Lanka 1987. But whatever the focus, Cuny's
approach was the same. He transcended the traditional relief worker's role of cleaning up the aftermath of a disaster
to one of limiting the effects of the disaster as well as building the infrastructure and societal levels that exceeded the
pre-disaster period. As Anderson observes, this approach
was indicative of the concept of disaster as opponunity that
Cuny had adopted early in h.is career as a disaster relief specia.list. Whether it was a natural disaster or a war-time disaster, Cuny advocated sei1.ing the opponunity of disaster
to construct a better place for people to live. Cuny's insights
went well beyond improving building practices and dwellings to agrarian reform. This is made clear when Anderson

Building in Oklahoma City to the U.S. policy to suppon
Russia and Boris Yeltsin in the face of a crumbling Soviet
empire and tbe phobia over the Domino Theory being played
out in Russia.
Although the bodies of Cuny and the others who disappeared have never been recovered, Anderson concludes that
Cuny and his pany were executed outside the village of StariAtchkoi on April 14. The details of the execution are open
to debate. The executions may have been carried out to cover
up a theft of a large amount of money from Cuny or to cover
up Cuny's knowledge that the abandoned missile base at
Bamut housed no SS-4 intennediate range nuclear missiles.

gree in international development from the University of

Houston. This was followed by a short assignment with the
Federal Model City Program, a program that put him to work
in developing the infrastructure of the poor. mostly Hispanic.
town of Eagle Pass. Texas. As Anderson points out, the defining feature of Cuny's vision of development and humanitarian aid projects over lhe coming years had its start in this
small Texas town with the need to take into account the
wishes of the people the development or humanitarian aid
project was designed to help. Without their input. Cuny
thought, the aid project would fail to achieve its potential.
A third defining moment came during the Biafra-Nigeria Civil War (1967-70), Cuny's first encounter with the
world of disaster relief where he helped coordinate relief
shipments to thousands of starving Biafrans. It was here

Book Review: The Man Who Tried 10 Save the World
writes the following: "Once the immediate physical crisis
has been dealt with, Fred argued, reliefagencics should not
be distributing food or medicines or blankets, but rather using
their funds 10 buy up land LO redistribute 10 the poor and
landless. and taking advantage of the economic ruptures 10
help the previously disenfranchised start small busi nesses."
Unfonunately, Anderson may be correct when he says that
"Cuny failed 10 appreciate-or. more likely, had refused 10
accept-... the profoundly ideological considerations that
had driven the American government's humanitarian aid
policy since the beginning of the Cold War ... :· The governments of those countries he was working in were Jess
sympathetic with Cuny's humanitarian mission . The path
was clear as long as those whom Cuny was serving were on
the "right" side, but a tilt to the political left created fonnidable obstacles, such as the targeting by right-wing death
squads of some of the Indians that Cuny taught in Guatemala.
Some of Cuny's bigger projects came in the early I 990s
with the civil unrest in Iraq, Somalia. and Bosnia. Although
some in official circles thought 1ha1 the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations of Eas1ern Europe
would lead Lo an era of peace and cooperation. Cuny saw
the unfolding world 10 be one full of violent possibilities
involving nationalist and ethnic strife. It would also be a
world full of opportunities for improvement. but more complicated because disaster response would involve a civilian-military-political alliance fo r it 10 work in increasingly
hostile environments. This became evident in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the massive refugee problem that was
created in its aftermath. As Anderson notes. one of Cuny's
more momentous taSks culminated the 199 1 Operation Provide Comfort that moved 400,000 refugees 10 a military security zone.
This was quickly followed by the 1992 Somalia crisis,
a depiction of what can go wrong in a famine situation and
what measures could be used 10 prevent a worsening of the
situation. Cuny's ability 10 assess the silua1ion and 10 devise means to reduce the loss oflife as well as bolster local
and national economies is inspiring. In laying out Cuny's
ideas. Anderson points out 1ha1 Cuny was insistent that famines are rarely the result of a massive food shonage. but are
due 10 breakdowns in food distribution, wilh Ll1e devastating result of increasing the cost of food beyond the means
of the majority of the people. The typical military response.
flooding the stricken area, seemed appropriate, but Cuny
noted lha1 it had serious flaws. The number of airdrops re-
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quired 10 serve the needs of those 100 far from urban centers
was extremely imprecise, unreliable, and expensive. Sending massive amounts of outside food aid 10 fixed feeding
centers in major towns would not only undermine the local
markets in those areas. but it would have the devastating
consequence of taking many farmers away from the fields
to seek food in urban centers. thereby making ii a food shonage more likely in the following year.
Anderson alludes 10 Cuny's willingness 10 publicly accept the use of military force o n the behalf of those who are
being victimized. TI1is shows up in Cuny's change ofhean
in advocating the use of force in Somalia, but only under
cenain conditions. h is reaffirmed by remarks that Cuny
made while he was working to install a water purification
system in Sarajevo. Bosnia, in 1993. Cuny grew critical of
the UN effort and eventually argued for the withdrawal of
the UN Protection Force, lifting the arms embargo against
the Bosnians. and form ulating a blueprint of comprehens.ive air strikes against Serb forces in Bosnia. Like many
things that Cuny did in the field, this radicalizing of bis view
of humanitarian assistance led many 10 find Cuny less than
neutral in his view of warring parties, which in many official corners played 10 his disadvantage. Yet Cuny may have
been right taking sides in lhe face of terrible atrocities.
A Ii ne journalist. Anderson illustrates his story wilh illuminating examples of Cuny's exploits. Al limes, these
examples become tedious, but neverdull.11 would have been
interesting had Anderson explained in greater detail Cuny's
approach to humanitarian relief and its radicalization. Despite these shoncomings, I found The Man Who Tried 10
Save the World entertaining and lively reading.his a splendid book. but one that ends on a disturbing note about Cuny
and those who follow h.is footsteps as humanitarian relief
workers: "He had become a living example of bis theory of
converting chaos into opponunity, finding his moment 10
shine in the massive upheavals that accompanied the end of
the Cold War. but in the end that chaos had taken his life.
His death also served as a reminder of a grim new feature of
modern war. no one is safe." Readers who deal with the
theory and policy of humanitarian relief should seriously
consider reading this book 10 instil.I in !hem a sense of realism often absent when they do not come face-to-face with
the horrors of war. but yet feel the need 10 assist the victims
1hat are left in its wake. The Man Who Tried 10 Save the
World could well discourage the would-be relief worker from
that calling, but it may also add more practitioners 10 the
ranks of those determined to improve lhe lives of others.

